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Korea has been one of the Asian nations most severely hit by the global finan-
cial crisis . At first glance, Korea appeared better placed to weather the shock 
thanks to its substantial cushion of official reserves, its improved policy frame-
work, and its very limited exposure to toxic assets originating in Western 
banks . However, given the region’s large trade volume and its financial integra-
tion with the rest of the world, investors’ views on the Korean economy deteri-
orated as global deleveraging intensified and world growth slowed markedly . 
This affected the foreign exchange markets as foreigners began to repatriate 
their funds out of Korean financial markets . As of the end of November 2008, 
the Korean won had depreciated by over 25 .4 percent in dollar terms since the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, the largest fall among major Asian 
countries excluding Turkey . The stock price collapsed by 27 .2 percent during 
the same period .
In fact, as Figure 1 shows, even before the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
Korean foreign exchange market conditions had already deteriorated . The fig-
ure shows daily three-year interest rate swaps (IRS) and currency rate swaps 
(CRS) . Differences in market floating rates such as IRS and CRS rates poten-
tially create profitable arbitrage opportunities if risks are limited to exchange 
rate risk .1 However, they also reflect other risks, including counterparty credit 
risk, liquidity risk, and funding risk . These risks started to rise sharply in early 
August 2007 when BNP Paribas suspended its fund withdrawals, and in Novem-
ber 2007 and March 2008 when news related to the subprime mortgage prob-
lems surprised the market .
Due to the evaporation of global liquidity, foreign currency borrowing con-
ditions for Korean banks severely deteriorated . The credit default swap (CDS) 
(five-year) premiums on Foreign Exchange Stabilization Fund (FESF) bonds 
showed marked upward trends (from 9 .14, 135 basis points to 11 .30, 368 basis 
points) and CRS rates fell relentlessly . In order to ease the foreign liquidity 
squeeze, the Bank of Korea (BOK) supplied a total of 26 .6 billion dollars in 
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foreign currency liquidity through its Competitive Auction Swap Facility using 
its official foreign reserves, and through its Competitive Auction Loan Facil-
ity using the proceeds of its currency swaps with the U .S . Federal Reserve . On 
October 19, the Korean government also guaranteed its banking sector’s exter-
nal debt until the end of June 2009 .
To strengthen its defense against global illiquidity, the BOK established 
a US$30 billion swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve on October 30, 
2008 . On December 12, the BOK entered into a 180 billion yuan/38 trillion won 
swap arrangement with the People’s Bank of China (PBC), and at the same time 
agreed with the Bank of Japan (BOJ) on expanding the ceiling of existing won/
yen swap arrangements from the equivalent of 3 billion U .S . dollars to 20 billion 
dollars . In spite of such efforts, deleveraging continued, and the CRS rate often 
fell into negative territory in February, March, and April 2009 . Figure 1 clearly 
shows that the foreign exchange liquidity conditions have not fully recovered 
yet . Domestic credit spreads on corporate and bank bonds have also widened 
rapidly with the illiquidity in the domestic money market . This phenomenon, 
often termed “double drain,” was unprecedented for Korea .
The Bank of Korea has responded with aggressive interest rate cuts to alle-
viate the credit crunch . It cut the “BOK base rate” on six occasions, by 3 .25 
percent overall . It also provided a total of 27 .8 trillion won in market liquidi-
ty—by conducting open market operations, increasing the ceiling of its aggre-
gate credit ceiling loan program, making banks a one-off payment of interest on 
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their required reserves, and contributing to the Bond Market Stabilization and 
Bank Recapitalization Funds . In addition, 12 securities companies were added 
to the list of eligible counterparties for RP operations, and bonds from banks 
and other institutions were added to the list of collateral eligible for open mar-
ket operations .
In addition to the global crisis, the Korean economy suffered from the oil 
price hikes that occurred during the first half of 2008 . From the second half 
of 2008, both the Korean export and domestic sectors began to feel the impact 
of the decline in international demand, and the fourth quarter annual GDP 
growth rate fell to –5 .1 percent .2 In January 2009, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) revised its forecast for Korean GDP growth from a positive 2 per-
cent to a 4 percent contraction . This was among its largest downward revisions 
for emerging market economies .
The rise in external debt has been a main cause for concern among foreign 
investors, even though the most recent increase in debt, that acquired since 
2006, has differed in structure from that in the period prior to the onset of the 
East Asian crisis . A major share of the increase in debt has been bridge financ-
ing by domestic banks . These banks engaged in forward contracts with export-
ers and asset management companies, and balanced their positions through 
borrowing . Furthermore, bad loan problems analogous to those that contrib-
uted to the Asian financial crisis did not exist .
The external debt of the banking sector drew particular attention .3 For the 
whole economy, the mismatch between the external assets and debts did not 
widen, but strong asymmetry existed in the private sector as foreign assets 
were concentrated in the monetary authority, and foreign debts were concen-
trated in the banking sector (Table 1) . This left severe mismatches in the bank-
ing sector .
Ta B l E   1 
external debts and Assets 
(period end, $US billions)
 2005 2006 2007 2008:Q2 2008 2009:Q1
External Debt 187 .9 260 .1 382 .2 419 .8 381 .3 369 .3
(short-term) (65 .9) (113 .7) (160 .3) (176 .2) (151 .1) (148 .1)
Banks 83 .4 136 .5 194 .0 210 .5 171 .7 161 .9
(short-term) (51 .3) (96 .1) (134 .0) (146 .7) (113 .0) (103 .8)
External Asset 308 .6 366 .7 417 .7 422 .5 348 .2 345 .5
(short-term) (212 .4) (242 .8) (266 .3) (261 .8) (279 .6) (278 .8)
Banks 53 .0 63 .2 76 .4 84 .5 83 .0 77 .3
(short-term) (39 .0) (39 .9) (45 .5) (51 .9) (52 .4) (47 .2)
Source: ECOS, Bank of Korea .
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The riskiness of the banking sector may not be coincidental . Figure 2 plots 
the rate of growth of the banking sector’s external debt percentages and the 
short-term external assets to short-term external debt ratios during 1995:Q1–
2008:Q4 . There is a negative relationship between these two variables, which 
indicates that when banks accumulate external debt, they tend to rely more on 
short-term debt . Thus, when banks accumulate external debts, both the risks of 
currency mismatch and of maturity mismatches tend to increase .
Before the global crisis, the banking sector pushed up leverage in Korea, 
while after the Lehman collapse, it suffered most from Korean deleveraging . 
This can be clearly seen from Tables 2 and 3 . They present the flows of for-
eign liquidity funds in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively . During 
2006:Q1–2008:Q3 of the 168 billion dollars flowing into Korea, 137 .4 billion dol-
lars were funded by the banking sector, 68 .3 billion dollars were domestically 
absorbed, and the rest were recycled through overseas equity investment, for-
eign direct investment, remuneration of foreign equity investment, etc . During 
this period, the monetary authorities were net sellers of foreign liquidity .
Table 3 indicates the sudden stop and reversal of capital flows during the 
global financial crisis . Between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1, 42 .8 billion dollars in 
assets were taken out of Korea . This deleveraging was concentrated in the 
banking sector, as it was not able to roll over its short-term debt . Even though 
the Korean government guaranteed banking sector debts, lenders withdrew 59 
billion dollars while the banking sector recovered 9 billion dollars . The mone-
tary authorities sold 25 .2 billion dollars of reserves .
Ta B l E   2 
uses and sources of Foreign exchange liquidity 
(2006:Q1 to 2008:Q3, $US billions)
Uses  Sources
External Asset  External Debt
 General Government 5 .0  General Government 15 .8
 Banks 33 .2  Banks 137 .4
 Other Sector 15 .3  Other Sector 63 .0
 Monetary Authorities 14 .8  Monetary Authorities 21 .5
Overseas Equity Investment 68 .2 Foreign Equity Investment –78 .2
Overseas FDI 34 .5 Foreign FDI 6 .1
Financial Derivatives –0 .6 Other 5 .1
Other Investment 6 .2 Current Account –2 .7
Other Capital Account –7 .0
Error and Omissions –1 .5
Total 168 .0 Total 168 .0
Source: Computed from Bank of Korea Monthly Bulletin .
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Ta B l E   3 
uses and sources of Foreign exchange liquidity 
(2008:Q4 to 2009:Q1, $US billions)
Uses  Sources
External Asset  External Debt
General Government –9 .1  General Government –5 .2
 Banks –8 .9  Banks –58 .9
 Other Sector –4 .0  Other Sector 2 .7
 Monetary Authorities –25 .2  Monetary Authorities 5 .3
Overseas Equity Investment –8 .2 Foreign Equity Investment –4 .0
Overseas FDI 3 .2 Foreign FDI 1 .4
Financial Derivatives 13 .9 Other –0 .1
Other Investment –1 .4 Current Account 16 .1
Other Capital Account –2 .1
Error and Omissions –1 .3
Total –42 .8 Total –42 .8
Source: Computed from Bank of Korea Monthly Bulletin .
As described above, Korea’s experiences during this crisis can be summa-
rized in terms of the capital inflows problem . Procyclicality generated by cap-
ital flows has been a major cause of vulnerability for small open economies as 
they can cause boom-bust cycles (e .g ., Kaminsky et al ., 2005) . Excessive foreign 
capital inflows lead to current account deficits and can cause asset bubbles and 
increase vulnerability to external credit tightening, which often result in sudden 
stops and reversals of financial flows . Since the East Asian crisis, the Korean 
economy has progressed towards closer integration with global financial mar-
kets . Its liberalized capital market has invited foreign capital inflows—but this 
has also enabled foreign investors to unwind their positions at the earliest signs 
of trouble .
The procyclicality of the banking sector borrowing can be confirmed in Fig-
ure 3 . It plots the growth rates of foreign assets and debt calculated from the 
banking sector balance sheet during 1995:Q3 to 2009:Q1 . Dots tend to be on the 
45-degree line, which implies that once the banking sector as a whole increases 
its foreign debt its balance sheet expands in lockstep, and vice versa . Through 
financial intermediation the growth of foreign debts is translated into growth of 
foreign assets, which push up domestic demand through various channels .
How important is the procyclicality of capital flows originated in the bank-
ing sector? Table 4 lists measures of procyclicality of various components of net 
capital inflows to Korea . Surely, capital flows driven by the banks are the most 
problematic .
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Korea’s recent experience offers important policy implications . Capital 
account liberalization in small open economies increases vulnerability to sud-
den large-scale withdrawals of foreign capital, and that is exactly what we have 
witnessed during the recent crisis . It should be noted that this problem has even 
occurred in countries with strong financial regulation and transparent financial 
systems such as Korea .
It has been argued that financial globalization makes it possible to enjoy 
collateral benefits such as domestic financial sector development, institutional 
improvements, better macroeconomic policies, etc . These collateral benefits 
have been said to result in higher growth for the globalizing countries, gen-
erally via gains in allocative efficiency . The recent crisis has demonstrated, 
however, that financial globalization can lead to collateral damage in emerging 
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Ta B l E   4 
Procyclicality of capital Flows: Korea
 1995–97 2000–08 2000–05 2006–08
Net Capital Inflows 0 .64 0 .47 0 .12 0 .94
FDI –0 .53 0 .04 0 .13 –0 .31
Equity 0 .40 0 .18 0 .18 0 .03
Bond 0 .18 0 .24 –0 .13 0 .70
Others 0 .71 0 .33 0 .06 0 .87
(Bank) (0 .64) (0 .41) (0 .00) (0 .92)
Note: Procyclicality is measured as the coefficient of correlation with quar-
terly real GDP growth rate in percent against previous year .
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market economies as well . Therefore, better management of financial openness 
in emerging market countries is the key issue (Committee on the Global Finan-
cial System 2009 and Choi and Kim 2010) .
One could defend oneself from such collateral damage by sufficient reserve 
accumulation . But here the question arises: How sufficient is sufficient? Accord-
ing to the Greenspan-Guidotti-Fischer rule, short-term borrowing abroad by 
the private sector should be absorbed as foreign reserves by the monetary 
authorities . However, the rule might invite moral hazard: While profits from 
borrowing are privatized, hedging of the associated risk is socialized (Rodrik 
2006) . Consequently, the private sector would like to rely on short-term bor-
rowing even more and the monetary authorities must accumulate even greater 
reserves . Furthermore, the moral hazard problem exacerbates the overall level 
of capital inflows .
Direct regulation on capital flows may be another viable option . However, 
there is little evidence that capital controls are effective in achieving their mac-
roeconomic objectives for longer than limited periods . The best solution, in my 
opinion, is to establish an incentive mechanism that can harmonize the indi-
vidual player’s optimizing activity in a way not to cause a deterioration of the 
system soundness, that is, by internalizing the cost of short-term external 
borrowings .
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NOTES
1 There are many other different ways to capitalize on potential arbitrage profits and, as a 
matter of fact, derivatives have been an important channel for capital inflows to Korea (Kim 
and Song 2009) .
2 In response to the crisis, the Korean government conducted an aggressive expansionary 
fiscal policy . According to the IMF and the OECD, the ratio of stimulus package to GDP in 
2009 was 3 .4 percent and 4 .22 percent respectively . These numbers are much greater than 
the G-20 and OECD averages .
3 The banking sector is composed of domestic banks and foreign bank branches .
